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I. INTRODUCTION 
In April of 1999, Zack Exley received a letter from a lawyer 
representing the Governor George W. Bush Presidential Exploratory 
Committee. Among other things, the letter expressed anger over Mr. 
Exley’s website, which poked fun at Mr. Bush and his campaign by mixing 
the general appearance of the Bush campaign’s website with satirical 
stories about Mr. Bush. The letter acknowledged that Mr. Exley was 
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participating in political debate, but it also stated that Mr. Exley’s chosen 
form of political expression was illegal. The letter claimed that copyright 
law prevented Mr. Exley from using the Bush campaign’s website as he 
had, and it threatened him with litigation unless he removed all material 
taken from the Bush campaign’s website.1 
The Bush campaign’s copyright claim was unusual. Copyright exists 
to provide economic incentives for the production of creative works,2 and 
copyright plaintiffs generally sue to keep the defendant from appropriating 
or destroying revenue streams the plaintiff would otherwise enjoy from the 
sale or other exploitation of the plaintiff’s work. The Bush campaign, 
however, had no interest in protecting revenue associated with the sale of 
its copyrighted material. Instead, it wanted to use copyright law to silence 
one of the candidate’s political critics. 
If the Bush campaign had chosen to accuse Mr. Exley of libel, 
portrayal in false light, or intentional infliction of emotional distress, its 
chances of success would have been extremely poor.3 Courts vigilantly 
apply the First Amendment to such claims in order to keep them from 
infringing free speech. Given the obvious relevance of Mr. Exley’s speech 
to a presidential election, it is quite likely that a court would use the First 
Amendment to dismiss a suit against Mr. Exley. What then gave the Bush 
campaign any hope that a court would not do likewise to a copyright suit?4 
The answer may lie in the curious judicial practice of ignoring the First 
Amendment in copyright cases. 
As many commentators have pointed out, copyright has an uneasy 
relationship with the First Amendment.5 The First Amendment guarantees 
                                                          
 1. W Says There Should Be Limits to Freedom, Chilling Effects Clearing House at 
http://www.chillingeffects.org/notice.cgi?NoticeID=265 (last visited Aug. 21, 2003) (reproducing letter 
accusing Mr. Exley of copyright infringement). 
 2. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8 cl. 8 (authorizing Congress to pass copyright legislation for the 
purpose of promoting “the Progress of Science and useful Arts”); Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City 
Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 429 (1984) (stating that copyright exists to encourage authors through 
provision of economic incentives); Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 219 (1954) (same). 
 3. See New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 299–80 (1964) (requiring libel plaintiffs 
who are public figures to show “actual malice” on the part of defendants); see also Hustler Magazine v. 
Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 56 (1988) (applying the actual malice standard to claims for intentional infliction 
of emotional distress brought by public figures); Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374, 387–88 (1967) 
(applying the actual malice standard to claims for false light invasion of privacy). 
 4. Perhaps the Bush campaign had no hope of success for its claim and knew that to be the 
case. However, the letter sent to Mr. Exley said that Exley’s behavior was “far outside” of fair use.  See 
W Says There Should Be Limits to Freedom, supra note 1. This implies that the Bush campaign believed 
its case was strong. 
 5. See C. Edwin Baker, First Amendment Limits on Copyright, 55 VAND. L. REV. 891 (2002); 
Yochai Benkler, Free as the Air to Common Use: First Amendment Constraints on Enclosure of the 
Public Domain, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 354 (1999); Robert C. Denicola, Copyright and Free Speech: 
Constitutional Limitations on the Protection of Expression, 67 CAL. L. REV. 283 (1979); Paul 
Goldstein, Copyright and the First Amendment, 70 COLUM. L. REV. 983 (1970); Mark A. Lemley & 
Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech and Injunctions in Intellectual Property Cases, 48 DUKE L.J. 147 
(1998); Neil Weinstock Netanel, Locating Copyright Within the First Amendment Skein, 54 STAN. L. 
REV. 1  (2001); Melville B. Nimmer, Does Copyright Abridge the First Amendment Guarantees of Free 
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individuals the right of free speech. Copyright, however, burdens this right 
by restricting the methods by which an individual can speak. 
For example, the author and publisher of the book The Seinfeld 
Aptitude Test were speaking when they wrote and published a book that 
tested the reader’s knowledge of trivia about the Seinfeld television series.6 
As such, the author’s and publisher’s behavior was entitled to full First 
Amendment protection, even if their book did not criticize a presidential 
candidate. Nevertheless, the Second Circuit found that the book infringed 
various copyrights in the Seinfeld series.7 Accordingly, the author and 
publisher could not publish their book.8 Similar restrictions on speech 
occur almost every time a court imposes a judgment of copyright 
infringement. 
The tension between copyright and the First Amendment does not 
mean that copyright is unconstitutional. As Melville Nimmer pointed out in 
1970, copyright also supports the First Amendment by providing economic 
incentives for the production of speech.9 Copyright may cause the loss of 
speech defined as copyright infringement, but it more than makes up for 
that loss by encouraging the production of noninfringing speech. In short, 
copyright is constitutional because it encourages more speech than it 
destroys. 
At the same time, however, it is important to understand that the 
general constitutionality of copyright does not make the First Amendment 
irrelevant in copyright cases. It is certainly still possible that particular 
applications of copyright violate free speech principles. Moreover, federal 
courts apply heightened scrutiny to regulations that directly burden speech, 
and copyright directly burdens speech. Courts should therefore carefully 
examine copyright to make sure that its burdens on speech are well-
justified. A number of scholars have applied this insight to argue that courts 
should apply the First Amendment to limit the scope of copyright.10 
This argument has not, however, proven convincing to courts. Judges 
almost always refuse to use the First Amendment when interpreting 
                                                          
Speech and Press?, 17 UCLA L. REV. 1180 (1970); L. Ray Patterson, Free Speech, Copyright, and Fair 
Use, 40 VAND. L. REV. 1 (1987); Pamela Samuelson, Reviving Zacchini: Analyzing First Amendment 
Defenses in Right of Publicity and Copyright Cases, 57 TUL. L. REV. 836 (1983); Lionel S. Sobel, 
Copyright and the First Amendment: A Gathering Storm?, 19 COPYRIGHT L. SYMP. (ASCAP) 43 
(1971); Alfred C. Yen, A First Amendment Perspective on the Idea/Expression Dichotomy and 
Copyright in a Work’s “Total Concept and Feel”, 38 EMORY L.J. 393 (1989); Diane Leenheer 
Zimmerman, Information as Speech, Information as Goods: Some Thoughts on Marketplaces and the 
Bill of Rights, 33 WM. & MARY L. REV. 665 (1992). 
 6. See Castle Rock Entm’t, Inc. v. Carol Publ’g Group, Inc., 150 F.3d 132, 135 (2d Cir. 1998). 
 7. Id. 
 8. See id. at 145–46 (affirming the district court’s finding of no fair use in part because the 
defendants’ book did not criticize or parody the Seinfeld series, but only “substitute[d] for a derivative 
market” that the copyright owner “would in general develop”). 
 9. Nimmer, supra note 5, at 1180–81. 
 10. Baker, supra note 5; Benkler, supra note 5; Denicola,  supra note 5; Lemley & Volokh, 
supra note 5; Netanel, supra note 5; Yen, supra note 5. 
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copyright law. According to conventional wisdom, copyright law already 
incorporates First Amendment values through the idea/expression 
dichotomy and the defense of fair use.11 Courts may therefore safely 
disregard the First Amendment in copyright cases because copyright 
“naturally” steers clear of First Amendment problems. 
Conventional wisdom about copyright and the First Amendment 
sounds elegant because it neatly solves a tricky problem in copyright. 
Unfortunately, conventional wisdom is also flawed. There is no particular 
reason to believe that copyright accommodates all First Amendment 
requirements, especially when the relevant doctrines do not even mention 
“free speech.” To be sure, the idea/expression dichotomy and the fair use 
doctrine support the First Amendment by allowing individuals to make 
certain unauthorized uses of copyrighted works, but that does not guarantee 
sensitivity to the many concerns behind constitutional guarantees of free 
speech. Even if courts understood these doctrines as the embodiment of all 
First Amendment values, the most obvious source for finding those values 
would be the cases that explicitly consider the First Amendment, and not 
copyright cases that purportedly establish the First Amendment’s 
irrelevance. 
The practice of ignoring the First Amendment in copyright cases has 
significantly affected the development of copyright. Among other things, 
the practice has made possible the problematic assertion of what I call 
“aggressive copyright claims.” As the label implies, these claims 
aggressively test the boundaries of copyright by urging courts to adopt 
unconventional or novel readings of doctrine that would extend copyright 
well beyond its core of preventing individuals from reproducing the 
copyrighted works of others. Accordingly, aggressive copyright claims are 
often made against defendants who have done more than simply “parrot” a 
copyrighted work. These defendants have generally added meaningful 
work of their own, whether in the form of comment and criticism, 
significant reworking of the plaintiff’s material, or new material unrelated 
to the copyrighted work. At their most extreme, aggressive copyright 
claims assert that almost any borrowing from a copyrighted work 
constitutes actionable infringement. Aggressive claims include claims like 
the ones made against Zach Exley and the authors of The Seinfeld Aptitude 
Test.12 
                                                          
 11. See, e.g., Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 555–60 (1985) 
(discussing the jurisprudence developed in the area of copyright versus First Amendment concerns); 
New Era Pub’ns Int’l, ApS v. Henry Holt & Co., 873 F.2d 576, 584 (2d Cir. 1989) (“[T]he fair use 
doctrine encompasses all claims of first amendment in the copyright field.”); Sid & Marty Krofft 
Television Prods., Inc. v. McDonald’s Corp., 562 F.2d 1157, 1170 (9th Cir. 1977) (“[T]he idea-
expression dichotomy already serves to accommodate the competing interests of copyright and the first 
amendment”). 
 12. See, e.g., Salinger v. Random House, Inc., 811 F.2d 90, 92–93 (2d Cir. 1987) (addressing a 
claim of infringement by author and recluse J.D. Salinger against biographer whose biography about 
Salinger paraphrased a number of Salinger’s letters); Sid & Marty Krofft Television Prods., 562 F.2d 
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Aggressive copyright claims are problematic because they exacerbate 
tension between copyright and the First Amendment. A defendant who 
combines his own original speech with material borrowed from a 
copyrighted source may commit infringement, but this does not mean that 
no free speech problems exist. Copyright judgments generally include 
injunctions that prevent the defendant from publishing or disseminating his 
infringing work. These injunctions impose larger losses of speech, as the 
proportion of new material in infringing works rises. Aggressive copyright 
claims cause a lot of trouble in this regard because they tend to be brought 
against defendants whose alleged infringements contain a significant 
amount of new speech. 
The conventional wisdom about copyright and the First Amendment 
allows for the assertion of aggressive copyright claims by making courts 
insensitive to the free speech aspects of these cases. Claims like the one 
made by the Bush campaign are more likely to succeed if courts “forget” 
the First Amendment’s concern for the preservation of political speech. 
Similarly, one has to wonder if The Seinfeld Aptitude Test would still be in 
print if courts consciously thought of copyright as a restraint of speech. 
Such insensitivity risks the inadvertent creation and maintenance of a 
copyright system that is incompatible with fundamental principles of free 
speech. 
Recently, the Supreme Court added another chapter to the story of 
copyright and the First Amendment with its opinion in Eldred v. Ashcroft.13 
In Eldred, the Court considered a challenge to the constitutionality of the 
Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act (“CTEA”),14 which extended 
the duration of both existing and future copyrights by 20 years. The Eldred 
plaintiffs made their claim on two separate grounds. First, the plaintiffs 
argued that Article I of the Constitution did not give Congress the authority 
to extend the duration of copyright for works that already exist.15 Second, 
the plaintiffs contended that the First Amendment required the application 
of heightened scrutiny to the CTEA, and that the CTEA could not survive 
such scrutiny.16 An opinion in the plaintiffs’ favor could have easily been 
written to emphasize the First Amendment’s importance in copyright. 
However, the Supreme Court rejected the plaintiffs’ constitutional claims 
and upheld the CTEA. In so doing, the Court deferred to Congress and 
applied a rational basis test. This led to the conclusion that the CTEA, 
although perhaps unwise, was constitutional.17 
                                                          
1157 (9th Cir. 1977) (addressing a claim of infringement by children’s television show producer against 
McDonald’s for an advertising campaign that used characters with general similarities to characters 
from the children’s television show). 
 13. 123 S. Ct. 769 (2003). 
 14. Pub. L. 105-298, 112 Stat. 2827 (1998). 
 15. Eldred, 123 S. Ct. at 775. 
 16. Id. 
 17. The Court wrote: 
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This Essay studies the effect of Eldred on the treatment of aggressive 
copyright claims. I suspect that Eldred’s deferential tone will lead many to 
the conclusion that the First Amendment remains largely irrelevant to 
copyright and that the analysis of aggressive copyright claims should not 
change. However, this Essay will argue that Eldred actually recognizes the 
First Amendment’s importance in copyright. By doing so, the Court has 
given the lower courts the signal to treat aggressive copyright claims with 
more skepticism. To do this, the Essay proceeds in three parts. First, it 
discusses conventional wisdom about copyright and the First Amendment 
in the particular context of aggressive copyright claims. Second, it studies 
the Eldred opinion, paying particular attention to the Court’s statements 
about copyright and the First Amendment. Third, the Essay shows how 
Eldred affects the treatment of aggressive copyright claims. 
II. CONVENTIONAL WISDOM AND AGGRESSIVE COPYRIGHT 
Aggressive copyright claims arise because it is hard to distinguish 
permissible borrowing from actionable infringement. Doctrinal limits on 
the reach of copyright exist, but those limits are frustratingly vague. It is 
therefore frequently easy for plaintiffs to assert plausible claims against 
defendants who justifiably believe that they have done nothing wrong. 
For example, consider the idea/expression dichotomy, one of the 
principal doctrines responsible for limiting the scope of copyright. 
According to this doctrine, copyright does not protect a work’s ideas.18 
Protection extends only to a work’s expression of its ideas. This means that 
people are free to borrow a work’s ideas, while borrowing a work’s 
expression is infringement.19 
The idea/expression dichotomy sounds straightforward, but it is very 
difficult to apply because there is often no reliable way to distinguish 
between a work’s ideas and the expression of those ideas. In fact, parts of a 
work may sometimes appear to be both an idea and an expression. This can 
be seen by analyzing a well known movie like E.T. the Extra-Terrestrial. If 
a person were to copy the general outline of the movie and write a story 
about an alien who comes to earth, befriends some children, but dies,20 
                                                          
 Beneath the façade of their inventive constitutional interpretation, petitioners forcefully 
urge that Congress pursued very bad policy in prescribing the CTEA’s long terms. The 
wisdom of Congress’ action, however, is not within our province to second guess. 
Satisfied that the legislation before us remains inside the domain the Constitution assigns 
to the First Branch, we affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals. 
Id. at 790. 
 18. See 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2000) (excluding, in express language, ideas from copyright 
protection). 
 19. See, e.g., Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99, 103–04 (1879); Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp., 
45 F.2d 119, 121 (2d Cir. 1930). 
 20. For those not familiar with E.T. the Extra-Terrestrial, the alien E.T. almost dies on earth, but 
survives to be reunited with his fellow aliens. 
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would she have committed copyright infringement? Our hypothetical 
defendant would surely argue that no infringement had occurred because 
the movie’s borrowed outline is an idea expressed by the movie itself. By 
contrast, the copyright holder would argue that the general outline of the 
movie is the expression of a still more abstract idea, like the possibility of 
friendship between strangers.21 
The indeterminacy of the idea/expression dichotomy strongly affects 
the idea/expression dichotomy’s ability to limit the scope of copyright. 
Every time a defendant claims that she is entitled to borrow a work’s ideas, 
the plaintiff can counter by arguing that the alleged idea borrowed by the 
defendant is actually the expression of another idea. This makes it possible 
to claim that practically any borrowing from a copyrighted work is 
infringement. 
Similar problems beset the defense of fair use. A central issue in any 
fair use case is whether the defendant’s borrowing significantly affects the 
market for the plaintiff’s copyrighted work.22 If the above E.T. hypothetical 
were to be litigated as a matter of fair use, the defendant would argue that 
her story does not affect the market for E.T. because her story’s sad ending 
keeps it from competing directly with E.T. and its happy ending. By 
contrast, the plaintiff would argue that the defendant’s story significantly 
affects the market for sad versions of E.T. The defendant’s story therefore 
deprives the plaintiff of revenue that could be generated from licensing sad 
versions of E.T. In fact, most plaintiffs can similarly argue that a 
defendant’s borrowing affects licensing revenues for some version of the 
work, and this weakens the fair use doctrine’s ability to limit copyright. 
The relationship between the ambiguity of copyright doctrine and the 
assertion of aggressive copyright claims creates a problem for copyright 
jurisprudence. Copyright’s scope is supposed to be limited. But, if the 
doctrines embodying those limits are capable of practically infinite 
expansion, does it necessarily follow that copyright’s scope should expand 
to the same degree? In my opinion, the answer to this question must be 
“no.” If copyright gets expanded as far as the idea/expression dichotomy 
and fair use will allow, copyright’s limits will become illusory. Given the 
lack of inherent limits to these doctrines, courts now have the challenge of 
finding a source of values that gives backbone to the idea/expression 
dichotomy and fair use. 
A fairly obvious source for these values would be the First 
Amendment. If aggressive copyright burdens free speech, First 
Amendment jurisprudence should offer some method for determining when 
copyright has gone too far. However, as noted earlier, courts have 
consistently refused to use the First Amendment when interpreting 
                                                          
 21. See generally Yen, supra note 5 (describing the indeterminacy of the idea/expression 
dichotomy and the simultaneous characterization of items as idea and expression). 
 22. See 17 U.S.C. § 107(4). 
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copyright law on the ground that the idea/expression dichotomy and fair 
use fully incorporate free speech concerns.23 
Brief reflection reveals the problems associated with this refusal. Yes, 
the idea/expression dichotomy and fair use support First Amendment 
values by limiting the scope of copyright. Unfortunately, the limits are 
simply too vague to offer judges anything but the most general guidance. 
This vagueness has the effect of making the outcome of copyright cases 
heavily dependent on judicial policy making that specifically denies the 
importance of the First Amendment. 
Ignoring the First Amendment may not be a significant problem when 
plaintiffs assert typical “garden variety” copyright claims. These claims are 
made against defendants who have engaged in exact or nearly exact 
duplication of the plaintiff’s copyrighted work while adding little or no 
additional work of their own. The typical garden variety case would be one 
of simple piracy, perhaps one with a defendant who is reprinting copies of 
the plaintiff’s book for sale to the public. Such cases raise few First 
Amendment problems. To be sure, a judgment against the defendant 
restricts the defendant’s ability to print and sell books—an activity the First 
Amendment protects. However, curtailing the defendant’s behavior does 
little harm to the marketplace of ideas because the defendant is simply 
reproducing the plaintiff’s speech. As long as the plaintiff continues to 
print and sell her work, the public continues to have access to the very 
same speech the defendant was distributing. At the same time, failure to 
enforce the plaintiff’s copyright claim would likely harm the marketplace 
of ideas because copyright gives authors like the plaintiff the incentive to 
write and publish books. If the defendant were allowed to undercut the 
plaintiff’s sale of her works, the plaintiff might not bother writing her book 
and the public might lose access to the work. In other words, the benefits of 
copyright clearly outweigh the costs of copyright in garden variety cases, 
so courts need not be concerned about missing something by dispensing 
with First Amendment concerns in such cases. 
The same conclusion cannot be reached, however, when plaintiffs 
assert aggressive copyright claims. These cases raise more serious First 
Amendment concerns because the defendant’s behavior can no longer be 
dismissed as the mere repetition of speech that the plaintiff already makes 
available to the public. Enforcing copyright against those who add 
expression of their own to borrowed material means silencing newly 
created speech. These losses are much more serious than losses of 
borrowed speech because no equivalent existing speech takes the place of 
silenced new speech. 
It is dangerous to put free speech at the mercy of the idea/expression 
                                                          
 23. Refer to note 11 supra and accompanying text (highlighting cases that held copyright law 
already incorporates First Amendment values through the idea/expression dichotomy or the fair use 
defense). 
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dichotomy and fair use because those doctrines do not have enough 
substance to adequately protect something so important. Freedom of speech 
is an individual right guaranteed by the Constitution. Courts are not 
supposed to be wishy-washy when considering statutes—like copyright—
that curtail free speech. Instead, judges must scrutinize such curtailments to 
make sure that they are well-justified by “an important or substantial 
government interest.”24 Copyright decisions that favor plaintiffs—
especially decisions in favor of aggressive claims—are therefore matters of 
constitutional significance that require special justification, while copyright 
decisions favoring defendants are not. Accordingly, it is important for 
courts to begin rejecting the conventional wisdom that the First 
Amendment can be safely ignored in copyright. Instead, courts should 
think explicitly about the First Amendment in copyright, at least when 
considering aggressive copyright claims. Of course, a significant obstacle 
to this shift is the well-entrenched position that conventional wisdom has in 
copyright cases. The change in judicial behavior suggested here is therefore 
unlikely to happen without a sign from the Supreme Court that existing 
practice needs to change. As the next section will discuss, the Eldred 
opinion should have the desired effect. 
III. ELDRED AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT 
Eldred has its roots in the legislative struggles over the CTEA. Prior 
to the CTEA’s enactment, copyright typically lasted for fifty years after an 
author’s death.25 The CTEA extended all copyright terms by twenty years, 
including those of already existing works.26 Not surprisingly, a number of 
copyright holders lobbied heavily in favor of the CTEA. They claimed that 
the extra twenty years of copyright would stimulate creation of new 
creative works, thereby advancing copyright’s primary purpose of 
promoting the progress of the arts. These claims were disputed by others 
who argued that the existing terms of copyright were long enough to 
encourage the creation of new works and that the losses to the public 
domain would outweigh any marginal increase in incentives.27 
As a matter of pure policy, those opposed to the CTEA had the upper 
hand. Lengthening the duration of copyright stimulates the production of 
new works by increasing the monetary rewards that authors expect to 
                                                          
 24. According to the Supreme Court, a content-neutral regulation  of speech will be sustained “if 
it furthers an important or substantial governmental interest; if the governmental interest is unrelated to 
the suppression of free expression; and if the incidental restriction on alleged First Amendment 
freedoms is no greater than is essential to the furtherance of that interest.” United States v. O’Brien, 391 
U.S. 367, 377 (1968). 
 25. Eldred v. Ashcroft, 123 S. Ct. 769, 775 (2003). 
 26. See id. (citing 17 U.S.C. § 302(a)). 
 27. For an excellent resource concerning the enactment of the CTEA, see generally Dennis S. 
Karjala, Opposing Copyright Extension, Protecting the Public Domain, at 
http://www.law.asu.edu/HomePages/Karjala/OpposingCopyrightExtension/(last updated Aug. 8, 2003). 
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receive when they create. Under this logic, passing the CTEA would make 
sense if it meaningfully increased the expected monetary value of new 
works. The CTEA does not, however, have this effect. As an initial matter, 
relatively few authors make decisions about whether to create on the basis 
of revenue realized fifty years after they die. Moreover, authors who do 
care about this distant revenue stream will find that it is of practically no 
monetary value because time erodes the value of money. As Professor 
Joseph Liu has noted, it is not unreasonable to measure the present value of 
the CTEA extension to an individual author to be as low as $4.20.28 It is 
simply hard to believe that an extra payment of such a small amount would 
spur any author to write. When that minimal incentive for creation is 
weighed against the fact that the CTEA acts as an immediate twenty year 
moratorium against additions to the public domain, it is hard to see how the 
CTEA’s benefits outweigh its costs. 
The strength of the policy argument against the CTEA significantly 
affected the First Amendment aspects of the Eldred case, particularly in the 
lower courts. Like the Supreme Court, the lower courts probably perceived 
the Eldred plaintiffs as disappointed participants in a legislative dispute 
about the shape of industrial policy. Courts have appropriately stayed out 
of such disputes since the Lochner era, and the lower courts surely wanted 
to defer to Congress on the question of copyright’s duration as well. 
Congress had already lengthened the term of copyright many times in the 
past. Finding the CTEA unconstitutional would place all of those laws in 
constitutional doubt as well. Such a finding would also give courts the 
potentially impossible task of deciding how long copyright could 
constitutionally last. 
Unfortunately for the courts, the plaintiffs’ First Amendment claim 
made the issue of judicial deference a tricky one. Any extension of 
copyright’s duration implies an extension of the burden copyright places on 
speech. Normally, courts subject legislation that burdens speech to some 
form of elevated scrutiny.29 If such elevated scrutiny were to be applied to 
the CTEA, the CTEA would likely fail because the basic policy argument 
supporting the CTEA was so weak. It would therefore be much safer for 
the courts to apply a rational basis test to the CTEA if at all possible. 
Not surprisingly, the courts found a way to use the rational basis test 
to justify judicial deference to Congress. The District Court simply denied 
the relevance of the First Amendment in two sentences.30 The Court of 
                                                          
 28. See Joseph P. Liu, Copyright and Time: A Proposal, 101 MICH. L. REV. 409, 432–33 (2002) 
(analyzing the economic benefit to authors of the CTEA in light of the discounted value of money). 
 29. See, e.g., Virginia v. Black, 123 S. Ct. 1536, 1547 (2003) (noting that government may only 
regulate “‘certain well-defined and narrowly limited classes of speech’” (quoting Chaplinsky v. New 
Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571–72 (1942))); Turner Broad. Sys, Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 642 (1994) 
(observing that courts apply “the most exacting scrutiny” to content-based regulations of speech and 
“an intermediate level of scrutiny” to content-neutral regulations). 
 30. Eldred v. Reno, 74 F. Supp. 2d 1, 3 (D.D.C. 1999) (“The Plaintiffs’ first claim, that the 
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Appeals offered a bit more, explaining that earlier cases had rendered 
copyright “categorically immune” from First Amendment scrutiny.31 A 
rational basis test could therefore be safely applied. 
For purposes of this Essay, it is important to understand that the 
opinions of the lower courts offer an extreme, but plausible, interpretation 
of then existing case law. The interpretation is extreme because the 
Constitution is “the supreme law of the land.” It is therefore extreme to 
state that any form of legislation is “categorically immune” from First 
Amendment scrutiny. At the same time, however, the interpretation is 
plausible because—as has already been noted—courts almost never apply 
the First Amendment when considering copyright claims. Why then should 
a court pay attention to the First Amendment when considering a simple 
extension of copyright’s duration, especially when the Supreme Court has 
already noted that copyright supports the First Amendment?32 
The foregoing provides the necessary backdrop against which to 
understand the First Amendment aspects of the Eldred opinion.  The initial 
part of the Court’s First Amendment analysis followed the pattern set by 
the lower courts. The Court rejected an invitation to scrutinize the CTEA 
under the First Amendment, opting instead to apply a rational basis test.33 
This predictably led to the conclusion that the CTEA does not violate the 
First Amendment. These similarities could easily lead someone to conclude 
that the Court endorsed the idea that the First Amendment is irrelevant to 
copyright. However, the Eldred opinion stands on the premise that courts 
will either scrutinize copyright under the First Amendment or construe 
copyright law with explicit regard for First Amendment concerns. 
Consider how the Court declined the plaintiffs’ invitation to apply 
heightened scrutiny to the CTEA: 
We reject petitioners’ plea for imposition of uncommonly strict 
scrutiny on a copyright scheme that incorporates its own speech-
protective purposes and safeguards. The Copyright Clause and 
First Amendment were adopted close in time. This proximity 
indicates that, in the Framers’ view, copyright’s limited 
monopolies are compatible with free speech principles. Indeed, 
copyright’s purpose is to promote the creation and publication of 
free expression.34 
Note that the Court began this passage by excluding from First 
Amendment scrutiny only a scheme that “incorporates its own speech-
protective purposes and safeguards.” This language implied that the Court 
                                                          
CTEA violates the First Amendment, is not supported by relevant case law.  The District of Columbia 
Circuit has ruled definitively that there are no First Amendment rights to use the copyrighted works of 
others.” (citation omitted)), aff’d, 239 F.3d 372 (2001), aff’d, 123 S. Ct. 769 (2003). 
 31. Eldred v. Reno, 239 F.3d 372, 375 (D.C. Cir. 2001), aff’d, 123 S. Ct 769 (2003). 
 32. Refer to note 11 supra and accompanying text (listing cases). 
 33. Eldred v. Ashcroft, 123 S. Ct. 769, 788 (2003). 
 34. Id. 
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would have applied elevated scrutiny to copyright schemes without speech-
protective purposes and safeguards. According to this passage, copyright 
cannot avoid First Amendment scrutiny unless its purpose is to promote the 
creation and publication of free expression. Moreover, the Framers thought 
that limited copyright monopolies were compatible with free speech 
principles. This implies that copyright without limits cannot be 
constitutional, even if such a scheme were intended to promote the creation 
and publication of free expression. 
The Court’s approach to copyright and the First Amendment puts a 
great deal of emphasis on copyright’s doctrinal limits. A copyright scheme 
with appropriate limits largely escapes constitutional scrutiny, while one 
without such limits is subject to constitutional doubt. The plaintiffs’ 
challenge to the CTEA presented a clear choice. The Court could have 
applied elevated First Amendment scrutiny to the law on the ground that 
copyright does not contain the necessary speech-protective safeguards. 
However, the Court did not take this course of action, choosing instead to 
defer to Congress on the question of copyright’s duration. This deference 
obviously means the Court was satisfied with whatever speech-protective 
safeguards that already existed within copyright. The opinion then went on 
to discuss these limits. 
Not surprisingly, this discussion borrowed heavily from existing 
conventional wisdom about the First Amendment and copyright. First, the 
Court explained that the idea/expression dichotomy “strike[s] a definitional 
balance” between the First Amendment and copyright by leaving ideas, 
theories, and facts in the public domain, even if the work that expresses 
them is copyrighted.35 Second, the Court noted that “[t]he fair use defense 
affords considerable ‘latitude for scholarship and comment.’”36 
The Court’s invocation of the idea/expression dichotomy and the fair 
use defense could mean that the Court was not really serious about the First 
Amendment. After all, these doctrines are precisely the ones that courts 
have used to justify ignoring the First Amendment in copyright. However, 
the Court clearly did not endorse business as usual: “We recognize that the 
D.C. Circuit spoke too broadly when it declared copyrights ‘categorically 
immune from challenges under the First Amendment.’ But when, as in this 
case, Congress has not altered the traditional contours of copyright 
protection, further First Amendment scrutiny is unnecessary.”37 
The second sentence of this passage is particularly noteworthy. The 
Court could have expressed its deference to Congress in much broader 
terms. For example, the Court might have repeated the idea that copyright 
supports the First Amendment because it encourages the production of 
                                                          
 35. Id. at 788–89 (alteration in original) (quoting Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation 
Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 556 (1985)). 
 36. Id. at 789 (quoting Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 560). 
 37. Id. at 789–90 (citation omitted). 
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speech. The Court could have then concluded that courts should defer to 
Congress in all cases as long as copyright remains rationally related to the 
production of speech. Such deference would give Congress great freedom 
to alter not just the duration of copyright, but also the nature and scope of 
the rights granted to copyright holders.38 
It is therefore highly significant for the Court to have stated that its 
deference depends on the “traditional contours of copyright.” If Congress 
had expanded the substantive rights enjoyed by copyright holders, thereby 
altering the “traditional” balance between the rights of copyright holders 
and others, the Court would have taken a far dimmer view of extending 
copyright’s duration. Indeed, the Court’s language suggests that such a 
change would have been constitutionally suspect. This implication means 
that Congress does not have complete freedom to pass whatever copyright 
legislation it thinks best. The Court will defer on issues of copyright’s 
duration, but legislation that expands copyright in other ways will be 
subject to heightened First Amendment scrutiny. 
To put it slightly differently, the copyright system we have now has 
already been scrutinized and has passed constitutional muster. Congress 
can therefore lengthen copyright’s duration with relative impunity. 
However, a copyright system that gives copyright holders more rights than 
they presently enjoy would have no such presumption of constitutionality. 
Indeed, the application of heightened First Amendment scrutiny might well 
result in a finding of unconstitutionality. 
The Court’s attitude toward First Amendment scrutiny of the CTEA 
also affects how judges ought to interpret copyright law. Conventional 
wisdom allows judges to ignore the First Amendment in copyright cases 
because the idea/expression dichotomy and the fair use doctrine “naturally” 
implement all necessary First Amendment considerations. As was pointed 
out earlier, this practice is highly suspect because there is no guarantee that 
the idea/expression dichotomy or the fair use doctrine respond to First 
Amendment concerns. A particular interpretation of a doctrine might seem 
“right” from a copyright perspective, but questionable from a First 
Amendment perspective.39 In situations like this, courts following the 
conventional wisdom have simply gone with what seems “right” as a 
matter of copyright and ignored the First Amendment. 
The Eldred opinion, however, signals an end to this practice. 
According to the Court, the CTEA escaped First Amendment scrutiny 
                                                          
 38. For example, Congress might eliminate the fair use doctrine, deciding that reserving all 
rights to a copyright holder would encourage the development of markets for what would previously 
have been fair uses. In that scenario, Congress would perhaps believe that such development would 
increase the incentives provided by copyright. 
 39. For example, it might seem “right” to enjoin publication of infringing material as a matter of 
copyright, but it also may be questionable to do so as a matter of First Amendment principles. See 
Lemley & Volokh, supra note 5, at 199–210 (advocating that preliminary injunctions in copyright cases 
should be constructed as unlawful prior restraints under First Amendment jurisprudence). 
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because Congress did not change the “general contours” of copyright. The 
logic of this deference is clear. Doctrines like the idea/expression 
dichotomy and fair use keep copyright sufficiently narrow to give Congress 
room to extend copyright’s duration. However, if Congress were to 
broaden copyright, perhaps by altering one of these doctrines, the new 
copyright scheme would be subject to constitutional doubt. By this logic, 
courts must also be careful about expanding copyright through 
interpretation of the idea/expression dichotomy or the fair use doctrine 
because it does not matter whether a constitutional offense arises from 
legislation or judicial interpretation. If a litigant proposes an expansive 
reading of copyright, a court cannot adopt it simply as a matter of internal 
copyright logic. Instead, the court must evaluate the proposed reading as it 
would any legislation that expands the traditional shape of copyright. This 
means applying heightened scrutiny under the First Amendment, and it 
explains why the Court wrote—albeit in a footnote—that “it is appropriate 
to construe copyright’s internal safeguards to accommodate First 
Amendment concerns.”40 In short, courts may be able to ignore the First 
Amendment in garden variety copyright cases, such as those involving the 
unauthorized printing and sale of a copyright holder’s book. However, 
courts can no longer do so when copyright cases turn controversial, 
especially when the plaintiff asks the court to approve an aggressive 
copyright claim. 
IV. THE FIRST AMENDMENT AND THE ANALYSIS OF AGGRESSIVE 
COPYRIGHT CLAIMS 
The First Amendment requires courts to scrutinize aggressive 
copyright claims in two separate, but related, ways. First, courts must 
ensure that aggressive claims genuinely further copyright’s purpose of 
encouraging speech, and that the value of the speech encouraged outweighs 
the value of the speech suppressed. Second, courts must take due regard for 
copyright’s ability to chill the exercise of protected speech. 
Ensuring that aggressive copyright claims appropriately encourage 
speech is similar to the application of intermediate First Amendment 
scrutiny to legislation. Courts generally apply a two-tier approach to the 
review of laws that restrict speech. Under this approach, the 
constitutionality of legislation depends on whether the law is “content-
based” or “content-neutral.” Content-based regulations identify speech for 
restriction on the basis of its viewpoint or subject matter, while content-
neutral regulations apply to all speech, regardless of viewpoint or subject 
matter. Content-based regulations carry the risk of government censorship. 
Courts therefore subject content-based regulations to strict scrutiny, which 
amounts to a strong presumption of unconstitutionality. By contrast, 
                                                          
 40. Eldred, 123 S. Ct. at 790 n.24. 
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content-neutral regulations are less likely to represent censorship because 
they apply evenly to all speech. Courts therefore apply an intermediate 
level of scrutiny to content-neutral regulations.41 
The intermediate First Amendment scrutiny of a law restricting 
speech amounts to a moderately demanding test of the law’s proffered 
justification. According to the leading case of United States v. O’Brien,42 a 
content-neutral regulation is constitutional “if it furthers an important or 
substantial governmental interest; if the governmental interest is unrelated 
to the suppression of free expression; and if the incidental restriction on 
alleged First Amendment freedoms is no greater than is essential to the 
furtherance of that interest.”43 Courts deciding aggressive copyright claims 
can therefore avoid First Amendment problems in copyright by treating 
those claims like new legislation.44 
This analysis would begin by asking whether recognition of the 
plaintiff’s claim would promote the creation of copyrightable speech. 
Every plaintiff would of course answer this question affirmatively, but 
intermediate scrutiny means not accepting the claim’s justification at face 
value. Courts must realize that the majority of copyright’s incentive effects 
come from protection against garden-variety infringement. Authors 
understandably write books on the assurance that others will not be able to 
sell copies of the book. However, I find it hard to believe that authors count 
on stopping others from writing about their books or creating new works 
that bear passing resemblance to their books. Accordingly, courts will often 
discover that aggressive copyright claims do little to promote the creation 
of speech because most works would be created with or without the 
recognition of aggressive claims. To the extent that courts identify a 
relationship between aggressive copyright claims and the creation of new 
works, courts must then decide whether the value of new works encouraged 
outweighs the value of creativity that will be suppressed by the aggressive 
claim. 
                                                          
 41. See Erwin Chemerinsky, Balancing Copyright Protections and Freedom of Speech: Why the 
Copyright Extension Act Is Unconstitutional, 36 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 83, 89–90 (2002) (“In countless 
First Amendment cases, involving many different types of speech issues, the Court has invoked the 
content-based/content-neutral distinction as the basis for its decisions”). 
 42. 391 U.S. 367 (1968). 
 43. Id. at 377. 
 44. The Essay proceeds on the assumption that copyright is a content-neutral regulation of 
speech. There is some disagreement over this point within the academic community. Compare Lemley 
& Volokh, supra 5, at 186 (arguing that copyright is a content-based restriction because liability for 
infringement depends on the content of what is published), with Chemerinsky, supra note 41, at 93–94, 
and Netanel, supra note 5, at 54–59 (contending that copyright is content-neutral because its target is 
the impact of speech on copyright’s economic incentives, and not the viewpoint, subject matter, or 
communicative impact of such speech).  It is not my purpose here to settle this debate. I suspect that 
copyright may be content-neutral in some situations and content-based in others. At the very least, 
Professors Lemley, Volokh, Netanel, and Chemerinsky are right in their agreement that copyright 
requires at least intermediate scrutiny under the First Amendment. The Essay therefore makes the 
conservative assumption that the First Amendment requires only intermediate scrutiny of copyright. 
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The analysis suggested above will sometimes be enough to settle 
clearly the First Amendment aspects of an aggressive claim. In some cases, 
there will be a strong correlation between such claims and copyright’s 
incentives. In others, the connection will be nonexistent. In still others, 
however, there will be doubt. Courts confronted by such doubt may wonder 
about how to proceed. Is it better to err on the side of creating new 
incentives for creation, or to err on the side of allowing speech? 
The First Amendment requires courts to err on the side of allowing 
speech. To be sure, it is possible to claim that erring on the side of 
incentives promotes speech and that such promotion removes First 
Amendment problems. However, the First Amendment is not neutral about 
the choice between encouraging a speaker and silencing a speaker. The 
language “Congress shall make no law. . .  abridging the freedom of 
speech”45 is a prohibition against preventing people from speaking. 
Encouraging speech through copyright may be consistent with the First 
Amendment, but there is no constitutional right to copyright protection. 
There is, however, a constitutional right to speak. Courts should therefore 
resolve doubts in close cases involving copyright and the First Amendment 
in favor of defendants. 
The First Amendment law of libel provides a good example of the 
relevant insight. Like copyright, libel provides individuals with a right of 
action against others who engage in speech. Moreover, the justification for 
permitting the suppression of libelous speech is similar to the justification 
for allowing copyright. To the extent that the free marketplace of ideas is 
concerned with truth, false statements add relatively little. The state’s 
interest in protecting the reputation of individuals is therefore sufficient to 
outweigh the loss of false statements in libel actions. 
The explanation of libel’s constitutionality suggests that the 
government can make any false and defamatory statement actionable. The 
Supreme Court, however, has not seen it this way. In a line of cases 
extending from New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, the Court has applied the 
First Amendment to prohibit libel actions without “fault.”46 In short, the 
First Amendment protects those who take reasonable care from libel 
actions, even if they mistakenly libel someone. 
The application of the First Amendment to libel is instructive because 
it recognizes the importance of resolving ambiguities in favor of free 
speech. Like copyright, the interpretation of libel law implies a cost-benefit 
analysis. Aggressive maintenance of libel actions brings the gain of 
protected reputations, but at the cost of speech. Restricting the scope of 
libel increases speech, but at the cost of more injured reputations. In the 
absence of the First Amendment, courts might resolve this cost-benefit 
                                                          
 45. U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
 46. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279–80 (1964); see also Gertz v. Robert 
Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 34 (1974) (establishing that states may not impose liability without fault). 
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analysis in favor of maintaining libel actions. Indeed, this was the law 
before New York Times Co. v. Sullivan.47 However, application of the First 
Amendment requires the opposite. 
As the Supreme Court has noted, ambiguity clouds libel cases. 
Potential speakers may believe that they speak the truth, but they cannot be 
certain. Even if speakers have a high degree of confidence in the truth of 
their speech, they cannot be sure that courts will agree at a trial. These 
doubts mean that risk-averse individuals will sometimes refuse to speak for 
fear of libel actions, even when they would otherwise speak the truth.48 
According to the Court, the chilling effect of libel raises significant 
First Amendment problems. The distinction between false speech and true 
speech may justify libel’s existence, but straightforward application of that 
distinction frightens some people into not exercising their rights of free 
speech. The First Amendment therefore requires the construction of libel 
law in a manner that gives additional breathing room to those who speak 
the truth, even if that means allowing a certain number of otherwise 
legitimate libel claims to go unredressed.49 Courts have done this by 
imposing requirements of actual malice and fault in libel cases. By sending 
the message that doubts in those cases will be resolved in favor of 
defendants, these requirements have had the effect of curbing aggressive 
libel claims. 
The First Amendment should have a similar effect in copyright. Like 
libel, copyright operates on a division between actionable speech and 
protected speech. Potential speakers must assess whether any borrowing 
from a copyrighted work will subject them to legal action because of their 
speech. As in libel cases, these speakers must confront ambiguities. They 
may believe that they are borrowing only ideas, or that their borrowing 
constitutes fair use. However, that belief is no guarantee that a court will 
agree. A certain number of future authors will therefore refuse to create for 
fear of copyright litigation, even though they have a constitutionally 
guaranteed right to do so. The loss of this speech is comparably serious to 
the loss of speech in libel. Accordingly, courts should construct copyright 
to give potential speakers breathing room from the fear of copyright 
litigation, even if this means allowing some otherwise legitimate copyright 
claims to go unredressed. This can be accomplished, at least in part, by 
resolving doubts in aggressive copyright claims in favor of defendants. 
                                                          
 47. New York Times, 362 U.S. at 267 (“Once ‘libel per se’ has been established, the defendant 
has no defense as to stated facts unless he can persuade the jury that they were true in all their 
particulars.”). 
 48. Id. at 300–01. 
 49. See Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 52 (1988) (“[E]ven though falsehoods have 
little value in and of themselves, they are ‘nevertheless inevitable in free debate,’ and a rule that would 
impose strict liability on a publisher for false factual assertions would have an undoubted ‘chilling’ 
effect on speech relating to public figures that does have constitutional value.” (citation omitted)). 
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V. APPLYING THE FIRST AMENDMENT TO AN AGGRESSIVE COPYRIGHT 
CLAIM 
It is now appropriate to illustrate the effect of the suggestions made 
here by applying the First Amendment to an actual case that involved 
aggressive copyright. To do this, this Essay will again consider the case of 
Castle Rock Entertainment, Inc. v. Carol Publishing Group, Inc., which 
found that The Seinfeld Aptitude Test trivia book infringed the Seinfeld 
television series. This case is a good example of an aggressive copyright 
claim because the defendant did not simply repeat the plaintiff’s 
expression. Instead, the defendant wrote a book about the plaintiff’s 
television series that tested the reader’s knowledge of various Seinfeld 
trivia. As such, it was not at all clear that the defendant’s behavior 
constituted infringement.  The court acknowledged as much by opening its 
opinion with the statement, “This case presents two interesting and 
somewhat novel issues of copyright law.”50 Nevertheless, the court found 
against the defendant. 
Castle Rock follows conventional wisdom about copyright and the 
First Amendment. The court knew that the case raised speech concerns, but 
chose to ignore them, writing that “free speech and public interest 
considerations are of little relevance in this case.”51 The court’s unanimous 
decision therefore stands entirely on internal copyright considerations. The 
court found that the defendant copied sufficient material from the Seinfeld 
shows to constitute infringement.52 The court then rejected the defense of 
fair use by finding that the defendant did little to criticize or transform the 
Seinfeld shows, and by noting that the defendant’s behavior harmed the 
plaintiff’s ability to exploit the market for Seinfeld trivia books.53 
In my view, the Castle Rock opinion demonstrates how the 
conventional wisdom about copyright and the First Amendment 
compromises the quality of copyright jurisprudence. As a doctrinal matter, 
the case could have come out either way. For example, a court could have 
held that the defendant did not commit infringement because The Seinfeld 
Aptitude Test borrowed only ideas from the copyrighted original. 
Alternatively, a court could have held that the defendant’s borrowing was 
fair use because the borrowed trivia comprised only a small part of the 
Seinfeld shows and because trivia books have little impact on the market 
for original shows. This shows that Castle Rock cannot be characterized as 
a case whose outcome was preordained by doctrine. 
Castle Rock’s copyright analysis is weak because it accepts an 
aggressive copyright claim without a satisfactory explanation. The court 
                                                          
 50. Castle Rock Entm’t, Inc. v. Carol Publ’g Group, Inc., 150 F.3d 132, 135 (2d Cir. 1998). 
 51. Id. at 146. 
 52. Id. at 137–39. 
 53. Id. at 141–46 (addressing several elements of the fair use defense). 
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understands the policy matters,54 but it does not explain why recognizing 
the aggressive copyright claim encourages more speech than it suppresses. 
The decision effectively outlaws the writing of trivia books about 
copyrighted works. This is a First Amendment loss worth worrying about, 
but the court sweeps this problem aside with the broom of conventional 
wisdom. 
By contrast, consider what would have happened if the Castle Rock 
court had applied the First Amendment as suggested above. To start, it 
would have seriously studied the relationship between protecting copyright 
holders from unauthorized trivia books and the willingness of future 
authors to create new works. Personally, I doubt if there are any authors 
(including television producers) who would not create because people 
might someday write unauthorized trivia books about their works.55 
However, if the court somehow believed that protecting the market for 
trivia books would lead to increased authorship, it would still have looked 
carefully at whether that marginal increase in authorship outweighed the 
losses represented by unauthorized trivia books that would no longer be 
written.  If the court concluded that a judgment for the plaintiff was still 
warranted, the court would then have considered how its decision would 
chill future authors of noninfringing trivia books.56 To the extent that those 
authors might choose not to write for fear of copyright litigation, the court 
would interpret the idea/expression dichotomy or fair use doctrine to avoid 
the loss of those books, even if it meant allowing the plaintiff’s claim to go 
unredressed. 
The revised analysis of Castle Rock provided here is superior to the 
one actually provided in the opinion. Aggressive copyright claims are 
controversial for good reason. Courts should therefore think hard before 
accepting them. Explicit reference to the First Amendment in copyright 
cases forces courts to think hard, by reminding courts that aggressive 
copyright raises genuine problems of free speech. Unfortunately, the Castle 
                                                          
 54. The court wrote that “[t]he ultimate test of fair use, therefore, is whether the copyright law’s 
goal of ‘promot[ing] the Progress of Science and useful Arts,’ would be better served by allowing the 
use than by preventing it.” Id. at 141 (second alteration in original) (citations omitted). 
 55. In fact, common sense suggests that authors ought to be pleased if such trivia books get 
written because the writing of such books would occur only after the authors’ works have reached a 
high enough level of prominence to make them the subject of new writing. 
 56. The chilling effect of decisions like Castle Rock cannot be easily dismissed. There are at 
least two other cases holding that books about popular television shows were infringing. See Twin 
Peaks Prods., Inc. v. Publ’ns Int’l, Ltd., 996 F.2d 1366, 1373 (2d Cir. 1993) (finding that a book about 
the television series Twin Peaks was infringing); Paramount Pictures Corp. v. Carol Publ’g Group, Inc., 
Nos. 98-7826, 98-7918, 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 9218, at *2 (2d Cir. May 13, 1999) (affirming a 
preliminary injunction against book The Joy of Trek, while admitting that the alleged infringement is 
“different in degree” from that of Castle Rock). If an author were contemplating a book about a 
television series, she would have to consider the possibility of being sued. Moreover, the author could 
not count on defeating the suit, nor could she easily determine what to do in order to escape liability. 
Given that individual authors frequently do not have the financial resources to support litigation, it is 
easy to imagine that a nontrivial number of otherwise noninfringing books will never be written. 
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Rock court did not sufficiently scrutinize the First Amendment aspects of 
an aggressive copyright claim and wound up accepting such a claim 
without sufficient justification. I happen to think that explicit reference to 
the First Amendment would have led the Castle Rock court to a decision in 
favor of the defendants. Of course, I could be wrong. Even if I am wrong, 
however, the court would still have been forced to answer the questions 
raised by a First Amendment analysis of the case. Answering these 
questions would, at the very least, have improved the court’s opinion 
because those answers would have provided good reasons for the approval 
of an aggressive copyright claim. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
This Essay has identified the problem of aggressive copyright claims, 
particularly the effect of those claims on free speech. The Essay has also 
described the conventional wisdom about copyright and the First 
Amendment, and how conventional wisdom allows courts to ignore the free 
speech problems raised by aggressive copyright claims. Finally, the Essay 
has shown that the Supreme Court’s opinion in Eldred signals an end to the 
practice of ignoring the First Amendment in copyright, and it has shown 
how proper recognition of the First Amendment improves judicial 
evaluation of aggressive copyright claims. Hopefully, future courts will 
follow Eldred and give the First Amendment its appropriate place in 
copyright jurisprudence. By doing so, those courts will preserve 
copyright’s incentives while ensuring rights of free speech. 
 
